Lockheed L-1011-100 N31031

Summary

On 25 August 1996 at about 11:10 local time, a Lockheed L-1011-100 registered N31031 was involved in an accident near Jamaica, New York, United States. 262 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

25 August 1996 at 11:10

Classification

Accident

Location

Jamaica, New York, United States

Nearest airport

John F Kennedy (KJFK)

Coordinates

40.6507, -73.7902

Aircraft

Lockheed L-1011-100

Registration

N31031

Category

Airplane

Engines

3

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Purpose of flight

Unknown

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Las Vegas → Unknown

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

IMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

NYC96FA174

Nobody was injured.

failure of the flight crew to complete the published checklist and to adequately cross-check the actions of each other, which resulted in their failure to detect that the leading edge slats had not extended and led to the aircraft's tail contacting the runway during the computer-driven, auto-land flare for landing. Factors related to the accident were: the manufacturer's inadequate inspection procedures for the slat drive system; and the operator's inadequate checklist, which did not include having the flight engineer monitor the double needle slat gauge.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During arrival, the flight (flt) received vectors for ILS runway (rwy) 4R approach (apch). Before reaching final apch fix, visibility went below minimums for rwy 4R, & flt was offered ILS rwy 4L apch, which was still above minimums. Captain accepted, & 1st officer (F/O), who was flying the aircraft (acft), transitioned to 4L. On final apch, acft passed thru 500' AGL at 151 KCAS with throttles near idle. It continued decelerating to reference landing speed. During computer-driven, auto-land flare, acft nose rotated up, & acft's tail struck rwy. The operator's (oper's) procedures required mandatory go-around unless apch was stabilized at 500'. The crew reported all checklists had been completed; however, apch charts for rwy 4L were not reviewed, required call outs were not remembered as given by all crewmembers, & altimeter bugs remained set for runway 4R. DFDR data revealed the wing leading edge slats had not extended with the flaps. A green light on the pilot's instrument panel & 14 green lights & a gauge on the flt engineer's (F/E's) panel were not used to verify slat extension. Oper's expanded landing checklist did not require F/E to use gauge to verify slat extension. Oper's manuals did not list possibility of a "slat lock," which would not activate any warning lights or aural warnings. Maintenance records revealed slats had locked 12 times in preceding 2 yrs. Inspection methods provided by Lockheed & adopted by the oper, did not adequately specify how to check slat drive system for slack.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.