Beechcraft 95-B55 (T42A) N4321Z

Summary

On 17 May 2025 at about 16:03 local time, a Beechcraft 95-B55 (T42A) registered N4321Z, operated by Cedocs, was involved in an accident near Broomfield, Colorado, United States. 2 people were on board and 2 died. The aircraft was destroyed. No probable cause has been published yet; this accident is still under investigation.

Date

17 May 2025 at 16:03

Classification

Accident

Location

Broomfield, Colorado, United States

Nearest airport

Rocky Mountain Metro (BJC)

Coordinates

39.9343, -105.1168

Aircraft

Beechcraft 95-B55 (T42A)

Registration

N4321Z

Category

Airplane

Year built

1972

Engines

2

Operator

Cedocs

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Broomfield → Sidney

Aircraft damage

Destroyed

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

CEN25FA178

2 people died.

The NTSB has not published a probable cause for this record. The investigation is still open; a final report usually follows one to two years after the accident.

Nothing about the cause is stated here that is not in the source record.

Read the full NTSB narrative

On May 17, 2025, about 1003 mountain daylight time, a Beechcraft 95-B55, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Broomfield, Colorado. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to family members, the owner was providing a cross-country familiarity flight to the pilot-rated passenger who had recently purchased a similar airplane. Preliminary air traffic control (ATC) radar data showed the airplane depart runway 30R from the Rocky Mountain Metro Airport (BJC), Broomfield, about 1000. Shortly after rotation, the pilot made a radio call to the BJC control tower stating, “we had a door pop, we need to come back around.” ATC subsequently replied that the pilot could make “right closed traffic for 30R” along with asking the pilot are “you going to climb?” Airport surveillance camera footage and radar data showed the airplane stopped its initial climb at 6,024 ft mean sea level (msl), about 400 ft above ground level, shortly after passing the departure end of runway 30R. ATC made numerous attempts to elicit a response from the pilot stating that they were cleared to land runway 30R and further cleared the pilot to land the airplane on any runway. The airplane entered the right traffic pattern for runway 30R, as instructed, and started a continuous slow descent. During the right crosswind to downwind turn, the airplane slowed from 94 knots (kts) groundspeed at 1002:12 to 81 kts about 15 seconds later. At 1002:49, surveillance camera video from a bus stop along U.S. Route 36, located near the right downwind traffic pattern leg, captured the airplane with the landing gear extended entering a left bank that increased in roll rate until the airplane was in an inverted left wing down and nose low dive at 1002:53. The surveillance video shows what appears to be an open door, consistent with the pilot’s report to ATC (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Surveillance camera video still image. The accident site was in a flat open field about 1.5 nautical miles north of runway 30R. Impact marks and debris were consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in an estimated 90° left bank and nose down attitude. During the impact, the airplane rotated counterclockwise 180° opposite the direction of travel and came to rest upright. The debris field was about 85 ft in length with evidence of a postaccident fire. The main cabin door was separated from the airplane, located on the left side of the debris path, and the door handle was found in the open position (see Figure 2). The rear sloped latch, lower pin, and upper claw latch were found in the locked position. Figure 2. Interior side of main cabin door The components of the cabin baggage door thumb latch were located in the fuselage debris, and the latch was found in the closed and locked position. The nose baggage door could not be identified due to impact fragmentation of the forward fuselage. Flight control continuity was established from all flight control surfaces to their respective controls.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.