Lockheed L-1011 N303EA

Summary

On 1 March 1994 at about 03:05 local time, a Lockheed L-1011 registered N303EA, operated by Rich International Airways, was involved in an accident near Fairbanks, Alaska, United States. 14 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

1 March 1994 at 03:05

Classification

Accident

Location

Fairbanks, Alaska, United States

Nearest airport

Fairbanks Intl (FAI)

Coordinates

64.8105, -147.7196

Aircraft

Lockheed L-1011

Registration

N303EA

Category

Airplane

Engines

3

Operator

Rich International Airways

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Unknown

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Unknown → Miami

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Night/Dark

NTSB number

ANC94FA036

Nobody was injured.

FAILURE OF THE SIXTH STAGE DISC ON THE INTERMEDIATE COMPRESSOR STAGE 6/7TH ROTOR SHAFT ASSEMBLY IN THE NUMBER THREE ENGINE, DUE TO CORROSION PITTING AND FATIGUE CRACKING OF THE FAILED DISC. A FACTOR RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS: FAILURE OF THE AIRLINE COMPANY TO FOLLOW PROVISIONS OF THE SERVICE BULLETIN. FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE TO THE NUMBER ONE ENGINE WAS THE RESULT OF THE UNCONTAINED FAILURE OF THE NUMBER THREE ENGINE.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

AS FULL POWER WAS APPLIED FOR TAKEOFF, THERE WAS A RUPTURE OF THE 6TH STAGE DISC ON THE INTERMEDIATE COMPRESSOR 6/7TH ROTOR SHAFT ASSEMBLY IN THE #3 ENGINE. PIECES OF DISC SEVERED A FUEL INLET LINE & PENETRATED THE #1 ENGINE & THE FUSELAGE. FIRE WARNINGS FOR THE #3 & #1 ENGINES WERE ACTIVATED & ENGINE FIRE BOTTLES WERE DISCHARGED DURING AN ABORTED TAKEOFF. RESIDUAL FIRE IN ONE ENGINE WAS EXTINGUISHED BY AIRPORT FIRE FIGHTERS. ABOUT 80% OF THE FAILED DISC WAS FOUND; METALLURGICAL EXAMINATION SHOWED CORROSION PITTING & SMALL FATIGUE CRACKS AT THE ATTACHMENT HOLES. THE LARGEST CRACK WAS 0.13' DEEP & 0.23' WIDE. ACCORDING TO ROLLS ROYCE CALCULATIONS, THIS SIZE CRACK WOULD NOT HAVE RESULTED IN FAILURE UNLESS THE N2 ROTOR RPM HAD REACHED 118%. A TELLTALE MARKER FOR THE FLIGHT ENGINEER'S #3 N2 GAUGE SHOWED 106% (RED-LINE WAS 102.5%), BUT THE TELLTALE MARKER WAS OUT OF CALIBRATION; THEREFORE, OVERSPEED WAS NOT VERIFIED. MAX EPR FOR TAKEOFF WAS WITHIN LIMITS. SERVICE BULLETIN (SB) RB.211-72-9569 REQUIRED THAT ROTORS EXCEEDING 14,000 CYCLES BE REMOVED BY 4/30/93; THE FAILED ROTOR HAD 16,327 CYCLES. THE SB WAS 'S-MANDATORY' IN THE U.K., BUT IT WAS NOT MANDATORY IN THE U.S.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.