Cessna 172 N8805Z

The pilot departed about 3 hours before the accident for the purpose of building flight time. He performed one landing, taxi back, and takeoff at an airport en route, then landed at another airport after its published attended hours, intending to refuel the airplane. The pilot was unable to refuel due to his mistaken belief that the airport had self-service fuel pumps that were “out of order.” (The airport had no self-service pumps, but an unused underground fuel farm was marked with signage indicating it was out of order.) Airport personnel indicated that they provided after-hours fueling service upon request but that they did not receive any such request on the evening of the accident. The pilot stated that he checked the remaining fuel on board with a fuel measurement stick and that the right wing fuel tank had about 4 gallons of fuel and the left wing fuel tank had about 12 gallons of fuel. The pilot decided to fly to a different airport to refuel the airplane. Shortly after takeoff, about 400 to 450 ft above ground level, the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat field with trees, and the airplane came to rest upright. Both wings and the fuselage sustained substantial damage and the engine was separated from the firewall. After the forced landing, the pilot reported that he observed a “steady stream” of fuel leaking from the “left side.” However, during the wreckage recovery operations recovery personnel found about 2 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank and about 0.25 gallon of fuel in the right fuel tank. (The unusable fuel quantity for each wing fuel tank was 0.5 gallon.) There were no visible signs of fuel leakage on the airframe or on the ground. Postaccident examination revealed that the wing fuel tanks were not breached and that the fuel system was intact from the tanks to the fuel strainer inlet line at the firewall. Testing of the left and right fuel tank quantity transmitters with a multimeter revealed that both were out of the manufacturer’s specifications; this would result in erroneous fuel indications on the cockpit fuel quantity gauges. No mechanical anomaly was noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the low quantity of fuel recovered from the airplane at the accident site and the lack of evidence of any fuel leakage, it is implausible that that the airplane had 16 gallons on board at the time of takeoff, as the pilot reported. It is likely that the pilot based his fuel quantity assessment on viewing erroneous fuel quantity indications during the flight, and that the total loss of engine power resulted from fuel exhaustion. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, the fuel selector valve was found to be installed incorrectly, such that manipulation of the fuel selector handle in the cockpit resulted in opposite positioning of the valve; for example, moving the handle to the “left” position opened the valve to the right fuel tank line, and moving the handle to the “both” position closed the valve.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.