Piper PA28 N3079M

According to the operator, the flight instructor and student pilot were on a night cross-country flight. The purpose of the flight was to satisfy the student pilot’s night flight training requirements before completing a private pilot practical examination, and it was their first time flying together. The outbound leg of the trip was uneventful, and the accident occurred during the return leg of the trip. The flight instructor had obtained a weather briefing for the accident flight from an online commercial source. The briefing included a convective SIGMET that was active for the accident location and time. It warned of an area of severe thunderstorms with cloud tops to 42,000 ft, hail of up to 1.25 inches in diameter, and wind gusts of up to 50 knots (kts). Additional weather information was compared to a screen capture that the flight instructor posted to social media about 34 minutes before the accident (while the flight was enroute). Based on the airplane’s position at the time of the screen capture, the weather radar information depicted was about 10 minutes old. Given this information, it is likely that the flight instructor was aware that convective weather was in the vicinity of the planned route of flight but was not aware of the latency of the weather radar information and continued on-course in an attempt to fly past the approaching convective weather. According to ADS-B data and air traffic control (ATC) voice communications, the flight instructor contacted ATC about 30 minutes after posting the screen capture to social media, or 5 minutes prior before the accident. At that time the controller advised of heavy- to- extreme precipitation at the airplane’s nine o’clock position. ADS-B data showed that the airplane continued its northwesterly course and about 2 minutes later, the flight instructor requested an instrument flight rules clearance. The controller issued the clearance and provided an easterly radar vector to assist the flight in getting out of the weather. The flight instructor stated to the controller that the airplane was “getting blown around like crazy,” and the airplane’s flight track showed a turn to the northwest followed by a right circling turn. The controller reiterated the heading of 090º, and the flight instructor responded that they were in “pretty extreme turbulence.” The flight track showed a continuing right descending turn, and no further communications were received from the flight instructor. The airplane’s last ADS-B position was at an altitude of 2,200 ft and about 1,000 ft northwest of the wreckage debris field, which spanned 25 acres in a hilly, densely wooded area. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airframe or the engine. Overall, the distribution of the wreckage was consistent with an in-flight breakup. Based on the evidence, after the airplane encountered forecast severe convective weather conditions, the airplane’s structural limitations were exceeded, which resulted in an inflight breakup.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.