Cessna P210 N210JT

The purpose of the flight was for the pilot to return to his home airport. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and was cleared to the destination airport by air traffic control (ATC). While enroute, the controller advised the pilot of weather along the route of flight, and the pilot requested deviations around the weather, which were approved. About 7 minutes before the accident, the pilot requested an instrument approach to the destination airport. The controller asked the pilot if he could proceed direct to the initial approach fix for the requested approach, and he responded that he could after he passed an area of weather to his right. About 6 minutes before the accident, the controller instructed the pilot to turn to a heading of 080° when he was able. The pilot responded to the instruction but did not begin the turn. About 4 minutes, and 7 nautical miles, before the accident, the controller advised the pilot of heavy to extreme precipitation at his 2 o’clock position and 5 miles ahead. The pilot acknowledged, stating that he was beginning the turn; the pilot turned about 20° to the right and continued on a heading of about 340°. About 30 seconds later, and 1 nautical mile before the accident, the airplane began a right tightening and descending turn consistent with a loss of airplane control until the final track data point. The final seconds of flight track data and debris distribution were consistent with an in-flight breakup of the airplane. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. All fracture surfaces and control cable fractures were consistent with overload failure. Although the approach control facility was not at its fully authorized staffing level at the time of the accident, sector staffing was in accordance with local and FAA directives and had no impact on the accident. The controller provided weather information to the pilot and suggested routing away from the depicted weather, and when the pilot did not appear to start a turn, the controller used plain language to explain the weather conditions. Had the pilot complied with the initial or secondary issuance of the turn to 080°, the airplane likely would not have entered the area of known convective activity that likely contributed to the loss of control and subsequent in-flight breakup. Information from preflight weather information providers did not show that the pilot received weather information from any of these sources before the accident flight. Had the pilot received a weather briefing, he likely would have observed that the planned route and time of flight were coincident with active convective SIGMETs and forecasted thunderstorms. The airplane was equipped with forward-facing weather radar that could be displayed on multiple instruments in the cockpit. Due to the damage the airplane sustained during the accident sequence the investigation was unable to determine whether the radar was operational or in use at the time of the accident. Had the pilot been using the onboard weather radar, he likely could have utilized it as another tool to assist in avoiding the convective activity.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.