De Havilland DHC8 C-GNON

Summary

On 9 December 2019 at about 19:50 local time, a De Havilland DHC8 registered C-GNON, operated by Jazz Aviation LP, was involved in an incident near Keene, New Hampshire, United States. 18 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was slightly damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

9 December 2019 at 19:50

Classification

Incident

Location

Keene, New Hampshire, United States

Nearest airport

Bradley Intl (BDL)

Coordinates

42.9308, -72.2775

Aircraft

De Havilland DHC8

Registration

C-GNON

Category

Airplane

Year built

1989

Engines

2

Operator

Jazz Aviation LP

Operating rule

Part 129: Foreign

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Montreal → Windsor Locks

Aircraft damage

Minor

Weather

IMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ENG20IA006

Nobody was injured.

The arcing failure of the windshield heat L2 power wire on the right windshield due to unknown reasons.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

While on descent to the destination airport, an in-flight fire occurred at the right windshield terminal block. The flight crew put on oxygen masks and smoke goggles, extinguished the fire, and landed without incident.   The fire damage was concentrated in an area between the upper edge of the terminal block and the lower edge of the windshield gasket where the L2 power wire was routed. The L2 power wire was melted through in this area but remained intact on either side, indicating an arcing failure of the L2 power wire. The damage and melting precluded determination of whether there was any pre-existing damage to the L2 power wire before the incident. Examination of the windshield revealed that it had been installed on the airplane about 5 years before the incident, which was less than the 8.2-year average life reported by the windshield manufacturer. The windshield exhibited minor evidence of moisture ingression into the laminate around the edges and minor erosion of the exterior hump seal that did not contribute to the event. Review of the maintenance records showed that the operator was in compliance with all of the company and airplane manufacturer’s recommended inspections. The operator had performed the mandated inspections required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) but the application of Humiseal to the power terminals had not been completed, therefore, the operator was not in compliance with the AD. The missing Humiseal did not contribute to the event. The most recent inspection, which showed no discrepancies, occurred about 6 weeks prior to the incident.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.