Gulfstream G IV N619A

Summary

On 11 August 2018 at about 00:50 local time, a Gulfstream G IV registered N619A, operated by Pegasus Elite Aviation, was involved in an incident near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States. 7 people were on board and nobody was injured. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

11 August 2018 at 00:50

Classification

Incident

Location

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States

Nearest airport

Philadelphia International (PHL)

Coordinates

39.9494, -75.1706

Aircraft

Gulfstream G IV

Registration

N619A

Category

Airplane

Year built

1989

Engines

2

Operator

Pegasus Elite Aviation

Operating rule

Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

San Jose del Cabo → Unknown

Aircraft damage

Not recorded

Weather

VMC

Light

Night

NTSB number

DCA18IA265

Nobody was injured.

The flight crew’s misalignment of the airplane with a taxiway instead of the assigned runway, resulting in a low-altitude go-around late in the final approach and reduced separation with the airplanes on the taxiway.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

Pegasus Elite Aviation flight 19 was on final approach to runway 35 at Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The airplane deviated from the runway 35 centerline about 2.4 miles from the runway 35 threshold and aligned with taxiway E shortly thereafter. The flight crew initiated a low-altitude go-around, arrested the airplane’s descent, and started to climb the airplane about 0.1 mile from the south end of taxiway E. The airplane flew past four airplanes that were on taxiway E. The captain stated that he was flying a visual approach to runway 35 with the area navigation (RNAV) approach for backup. Both flight crewmembers stated that the RNAV needle showed that the airplane was centered during the approach. The captain stated that, as the flight proceeded inbound, the airport lights blended together, and he lost visual contact with the runway at a distance of about 1 to 2 miles out and at an altitude of 500 ft above ground level (agl). The first officer stated that he did not see the approach lights or the runway, and that the captain initiated the go-around 1 mile from the airport while the airplane was at 500 ft agl. Flight data recorder (FDR) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar data showed that, during go-around procedure, the airplane moved to the right from aligned with the taxiway to between the taxiway and runway, and reached a minimum altitude of 125 ft agl when it was 0.1 mile from the runway 35 threshold, at which point the airplane stopped descending and began climbing. FAA radar data showed that the closest the incident airplane came to the first airplane it passed was about 200 ft vertically. The airplane then flew past the three other airplanes that were on taxiway E while continuing to climb. The flight crewmembers initiated a low-altitude go-around because they did not recognize that the airplane was misaligned with the runway until late in the final approach. As a result, safety margins were severely reduced given the incident airplane’s proximity to the ground before the airplane began climbing and the minimal distance between the incident airplane and the airplanes on taxiway E. The high-intensity runway lights (HIRLs) for runway 35 were on step 1, the same level as the taxiway lights. Both flight crewmembers reported that they called the air traffic control tower to request that the runway light setting be increased, but their request was not heard on the ATC audio recording. The reduced visual cues could have contributed to the flight crew’s delay in identifying the airplane’s misalignment with the intended landing surface. However, sufficient visual cues should have been available to the flight crew to indicate the need for a go-around earlier in the approach, including the presence of four airplanes on a taxiway that was 400 ft to the left of runway 35.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.