Bombardier DHC 8 N363PH

Summary

On 5 June 2015 at about 16:15 local time, a Bombardier DHC 8 registered N363PH, operated by Champlain Enterprises Inc, was involved in an incident near Windsor Locks, Connecticut, United States. 37 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was slightly damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

5 June 2015 at 16:15

Classification

Incident

Location

Windsor Locks, Connecticut, United States

Nearest airport

Bradley Intl (BDL)

Coordinates

41.9392, -72.6833

Aircraft

Bombardier DHC 8

Registration

N363PH

Category

Airplane

Year built

1998

Engines

2

Operator

Champlain Enterprises Inc

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Newark → Windsor Locks

Aircraft damage

Minor

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ENG15IA024

Nobody was injured.

The arcing failure of the windshield heat power wire on the right windshield due to unknown reasons. Contributing to the severity of the fire was the lack of training or guidance provided to the crew for selecting the windshield heat to off that would cut power to the circuit.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The airplane suffered an in-flight fire at the right windshield terminal block while on approach to the destination airport. The flight crew donned oxygen masks, declared an emergency, landed without incident, and performed an emergency evacuation. Examination of the windshield revealed that it had been installed on the airplane since manufacture more than 17 years prior to the incident, which far exceeded the average life of 8.2 years reported by the windshield manufacturer. The windshield exhibited typical signs of aging with ample evidence of moisture ingression into the laminate around the edges of the windshield. The aging discrepancies noted were within the published limits and did not contribute to the failure. The fire damage was concentrated in an area between the upper edge of the terminal block and the lower edge of the windshield gasket where the power wire was routed. The power wire was melted through in this area but remained soldered to the bottom of the terminal block indicating an arcing failure of the power wire. The damage and melting precluded determining if there was any pre-existing damage to the power wire prior to the incident. The arcing of the power wire produced enough localized heating to melt the glass and cause the fracture of the inner glass pane. Examination of the maintenance records showed that the operator was in compliance with all recommended inspections from the airplane manufacturer, and the most recent inspection occurred more than 2 years and 3,500 flight hours prior to the incident with no discrepancies. The windshield manufacturer recommends inspection of the windshields at intervals significantly less than the airplane manufacturer. The crew reported at least two attempts to extinguish the fire, but the fire continued, eventually extinguishing itself. The windshield heat selector switch was found in the normal position which would continue to provide power to the windshield heating system. Switching the windshield heat selector to off would have cut power to the circuit eliminating the arcing and fire. There is no training or guidance provided to the crew for windshield arcing, smoke, fire, or overheat events.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.