Piper PA-34-200 N16389

Summary

On 28 January 2014 at about 17:45 local time, a Piper PA-34-200 registered N16389, operated by Richard Roberts, was involved in an accident near West Palm Beach, Florida, United States. 2 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

28 January 2014 at 17:45

Classification

Accident

Location

West Palm Beach, Florida, United States

Nearest airport

Palm Beach Intl (PBI)

Coordinates

26.6831, -80.0956

Aircraft

Piper PA-34-200

Registration

N16389

Category

Airplane

Year built

1973

Engines

2

Operator

Richard Roberts

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Marsh Harbour → West Palm Beach

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA14LA107

Nobody was injured.

The pilot/owner’s failure to maintain the airplane in accordance with a mandatory service bulletin and an airworthiness directive, which resulted in the nose landing gear collapse during landing.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot/owner reported that, during the approach, he noted that the nose landing gear (NLG) indication light was not illuminated. He aborted the landing and chose to fly by the air traffic control tower to have a controller check the position of the landing gear. An air traffic controller reported that the landing gear appeared to be down. The airplane was then cleared to land, and, during the landing roll, the NLG collapsed, and the airplane came to rest on the runway. Postaccident examination revealed that there was a hydraulic leak above the NLG actuator and that the NLG drag links were not secured in accordance with the manufacturer's maintenance manual. Over 9 years before the accident, the manufacturer issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB) that required inspections of the NLG, including inspection of the NLG actuator mounting bracket for cracks, elongation of the holes where the retraction link attaches, and loose mounting rivets, and the lubrication of the NLG assembly at a frequency interval not to exceed 50 hours. Subsequently, the Federal Aviation Administration issued an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring the actions contained in the SB. The postaccident examination also revealed that a microswitch appeared to have recently been replaced; however, no associated maintenance entry was found during a review of the airplane's maintenance logbooks. The review did reveal that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was performed about 2 years and 300 flight hours before the accident, that the AD was complied with at that time, and that no defects were noted. No other entries regarding annual inspections or compliance with the SB or AD were noted. Therefore, it is likely that the airplane was not in compliance with the SB or AD at the time of the accident, which likely resulted in the NLG being unable to operate properly and in its collapsing on landing. If the airplane owner had maintained the airplane in accordance with the SB and AD, the hydraulic leak and the improperly secured NLG drag links could have been detected and corrected, which could have prevented the NLG collapse.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.