Beechcraft 95 N2733Y

Summary

On 25 January 2003 at about 00:26 local time, a Beechcraft 95 registered N2733Y, operated by Robert Y. Cable, was involved in an accident near Rancho Cucamong, California, United States. One person was on board and one died. The aircraft was destroyed. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

25 January 2003 at 00:26

Classification

Accident

Location

Rancho Cucamong, California, United States

Coordinates

34.1303, -117.6094

Aircraft

Beechcraft 95

Registration

N2733Y

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Robert Y. Cable

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Upland → Unknown

Aircraft damage

Destroyed

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

LAX03FA074

1 person died.

The fracture and separation of a propeller blade during cruise flight due to fatigue and corrosion pits in the blade pilot bore, and an improper overhaul of the separated propeller by repair station personnel. Factors contributing to the accident were the FAA's inadequate surveillance of the repair station, and the repair station's inadequate procedures.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

While in cruise flight, a portion of a propeller blade separated from the right engine. The resulting vibration partially separated the engine from its airframe mounts, and the uncontrollable airplane rolled inverted and dived into a private residence. The house was severely damaged, the airplane was destroyed. The separated propeller was overhauled about 3 years and 5 operational hours prior to the accident flight. The separated 2.5-foot-long span of the failed blade was found about 1 mile from the main wreckage. The blade was examined by the NTSB's Metallurgical Laboratory, which found that the blade failed as a result of fatigue cracking initiated by corrosion pitting in the pilot tube bore. A fatigue crack had initiated at two corrosion pit sites in the bore, which had been painted over without the corrosion being dressed out during the overhaul. Also, many additional corrosion pits were located circumferentially in line with the origin area. The blade's bore was also contaminated with glass beads. All of these conditions found during the examination were contrary to the procedural steps in the manufacturer's overhaul instructions, and established that the blade was reassembled with an incomplete and improper overhaul. The FAA inspector assigned to oversee the overhaul company said he did not observe any repair station deficiencies during his surveillance inspections. A Safety Board inspection following the accident disclosed that the repair station's personnel were not following prescribed manufacturer overhaul procedures, did not have the required chemicals for blade treatment, and did not possess required procedure manuals. Additional inspections of other propellers overhauled by the company revealed that propellers overhauled as early as 1997, when the company commenced business, showed evidence of corrosion in the pilot bores, and were unairworthy.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.