Beechcraft A45 N44KK

While maneuvering in a simulated air-to-air combat scenario with another airplane, the accident airplane was in a climbing right turn when the right wing separated from the airframe. Subsequently, the airplane spun uncontrolled to the ground. The right wing was located approximately 1/2 mile north of the main wreckage. Examination of the separated wing revealed extensive fatigue cracking in both forward and aft wing spars. On July 9,1999, AD 99-12-02 was issued by the FAA mandating flight and operating limitations on all Beech A45 (T-34) aircraft until structural inspection procedures could be developed. The AD prohibited operations in acrobatic and utility categories, limited the flight load from to 2.5 "G's" and limited the maximum airspeed to 175 mph. Entries in maintenance logbooks indicated that AD 99-12-02 was accomplished on June 3,1999. A former customer of the operator had flown in the accident airplane in May, 2001, and recalled that during the flight, the instructor pilot told him that they pulled about positive 6 "G's." On August 16, 2001, the FAA issued AD 2001-13-18, which superseded AD 99-12-02, and required inspections of the wing spars for cracks per Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) mandatory Service Bulletin (SB) 57-3329. AD 2001-13-18 allowed the operator an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) or an adjustment to the compliance time if the method provides an "equivalent level of safety" to the AD. On November 13, 2001, the airplane underwent a 100-hour inspection at which time log entries indicated that paragraphs d(1), d(2), and d(3) of AD 2001-13-18 were complied with and that paragraphs d(5), d(6), and d(7) were complied with by August 2002. On August 26, 2002, at an aircraft total time of 8,031.4 hours, compliance with the remaining provisions of AD 2001-13-18, through the use of an AMOC, began with inspections of the rear spar bathtub fittings per the T-34 Technical Committee Report. No discrepancies were noted at this time. On December 16, 2002, the FAA issued a revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) number CE-02-38R2 to advise all operators to the available AMOCs for compliance with AD 2001-13-18. The aircraft then underwent two subsequent 100-hour inspections and an annual inspection with no work noted related to the AMOC. On November 5, 2003, the aircraft underwent a 100-hour inspection and entries in the logbook indicated that the mechanic called the FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) in Wichita, Kansas, and inquired about a possible time extension to comply with AD and AMOC requirements. According to the logbook entry, the representative from the ACO informed the mechanic that "as long as the rear spar inspection was complied with that the aircraft could continue to fly but the limiations specified in AD 99-12-02 would remain until AMOC completed." In a written statement, the representative from the ACO stated that he received a telephone call concerning the T-34 wing AD and SAIB, regarding certain AMOC's. He reported that the operator informed him "that the aircraft was coming up on the two hundred hour limit specified in the SAIB and that the aircraft would be grounded because the replacement spar was not yet installed. The operator wanted to know what could be done to continue flying." The ACO representative further stated that he informed the operator to "perform the inspections required by the AD. This would permit the aircraft to continue flying until the mod could be completed." On November 5, 2003, the rear bathtub fitting inspection was again performed with no discrepancies noted, 220.5 hours since the first bathtub fitting inspection. No documentation of a scheduled AMOC modification was found in the aircraft logbook. According to available records, the aircraft had not completed any AMOC or the Raytheon Service Bulletin. The lower wing bathtub fitting had been inspected allowing operation beyond the 80-hour limit with restrictions, about 2 weeks prior to the accident. On March 15, 2004, the FAA published AD2001-13-18 R1, which rescinded all previously approved AMOC's for the T-34 wing. The new AD also grounded any T-34 that had not accomplished the Raytheon Service Bulletin, and had flown more than 80 hours since August 16, 2001. The FAA determined that the AMOC's listed in AD 2001-13-18 did not address all critical areas in the wing spar assembly, and should no longer be valid.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.