Embraer EMB-135 N733KR

Summary

On 27 September 2003 at about 15:00 local time, a Embraer EMB-135 registered N733KR was involved in an accident near Flushing, New York, United States. 30 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

27 September 2003 at 15:00

Classification

Accident

Location

Flushing, New York, United States

Nearest airport

La Guardia Airport (LGA)

Coordinates

40.7772, -73.8725

Aircraft

Embraer EMB-135

Registration

N733KR

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Flushing → Raleigh

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

NYC03LA208

Nobody was injured.

The inadequate visual lookout by the driver of a ground vehicle, and by ground support personnel, which resulted in a subsequent collision between the airplane and ground vehicle. A factor related to the accident was the failure of the pilot-in-command and ground personnel to coordinate ground-handling procedures.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

As the airplane was being pushed out from the gate area, with only one wing walker positioned off of the right wing, the left wing and a refuse truck collided. There was no communication established between the tug operator, and the cockpit crew due to the lack of interphone headsets. The refuse truck operator stated he positioned the refuse truck behind the left side of the airplane to allow an assistant to exit from the truck to assure that there was adequate clearance to proceed backwards and outboard of the left wing of the airplane. The refuse truck operator then pulled forward approximately 4 feet to allow the airplane to be pulled back to the gate, and parked the truck. According to the American Eagle Embraer EMB Airplane Operations Manual, "Hand signals may be used at the Captain's discretion (e.g. inoperative interphone, inoperative headset or lightning in the area). In these cases, when hand signals are used, the following is required, an additional ground agent will be required, to communicate hand signals to the cockpit, as the push-out vehicle operator cannot safely operate the push-out vehicle and maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during push-out. This additional ground agent will maintain constant visual contact with the Captain during the push-out. A pre-push-out briefing must be held, between the Captain and ground agent, to thoroughly brief the hand signals to be used during push-out. This will ensure that both parties understand what is to occur before, during and after push-out." The captain did not coordinate push-out procedures with ground personnel prior to the pushback, and the additional ground agent was not present.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.