Rotorway 162F N162AZ

Summary

On 19 October 2002 at about 18:50 local time, a Rotorway 162F registered N162AZ was involved in an accident near Tucson, Arizona, United States. One person was on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was destroyed. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

19 October 2002 at 18:50

Classification

Accident

Location

Tucson, Arizona, United States

Nearest airport

Ryan Field Airport (RYN)

Coordinates

32.1431, -111.1728

Aircraft

Rotorway 162F

Registration

N162AZ

Category

Helicopter

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Tucson → Tucson

Aircraft damage

Destroyed

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

LAX03LA011

Nobody was injured.

the failure of the secondary drive shaft.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

Following a drive shaft failure, the helicopter collided with high vegetation and rolled over during an autorotation. In a statement to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot reported that while performing pattern and ground reference maneuvers, the helicopter experienced a mechanical malfunction. The pilot executed an autorotation and contacted high vegetation with the helicopter's right skid, resulting in the helicopter rolling to the left and impacting terrain. The pilot disposed of the helicopter in a waste dump prior to examination by FAA inspectors and the nature of the mechanical malfunction could not be determined. In a telephone interview with a Safety Board investigator, the pilot reported that the secondary shaft broke in half, resulting in a loss of drive power to the helicopter's main rotor. The pilot was aware of the advisory service bulletin issued by the kit manufacturer suggesting replacement of the secondary shaft assembly, but had not complied. Beginning in May 1995, the kit manufacturer released four separate Advisory Bulletins (A-23, A-26, A-32 and A-34) addressing installation, inspection, and shaft design change issues. Citing a history of secondary shaft failures, the most recent advisory bulletin at the time of the accident, issued May 2002, recommended replacement of the standard 30 mm secondary shaft with an upgraded 35 mm shaft.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.