Agusta A109A II N55NW

Summary

On 20 January 2002 at about 15:50 local time, a Agusta A109A II registered N55NW, operated by CJ Systems Aviation Group, was involved in an accident near Baring, Washington, United States. One person was on board and one was seriously injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

20 January 2002 at 15:50

Classification

Accident

Location

Baring, Washington, United States

Coordinates

47.7733, -121.4883

Aircraft

Agusta A109A II

Registration

N55NW

Category

Helicopter

Engines

2

Operator

CJ Systems Aviation Group

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Positioning

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Baring → Arlington

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Light

Day

NTSB number

SEA02FA030

1 person was seriously injured.

The sequential non-mechanical total loss of power in both engines 1 and 2 for undetermined reasons and the pilot's failure to maintain adequate rotor RPM to prevent a hard landing. Contributing factors were the tripped "RPM WARN" circuit breaker which disabled the engine failure and low rotor warning lights and aural warnings.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot aborted his mission due to snow, rain and foggy conditions and the aircraft remained overnight in an open field. The following morning the pilot departed to return to his base and shortly after takeoff he radioed that he had lost power in the #1 engine. He returned to the departure site and about 200-300 feet above ground lost power in the #2 engine. The rotorcraft pitched nose down and landed hard. A witness reported a mix of rain-snow, freezing temperatures and low ceilings at the time of the accident. Post-crash examination of the aircraft revealed no mechanical malfunctions. A laboratory examination of fuel from several sources within the rotorcraft as well as both airframe fuel filters revealed no significant anomalies. Both engines were test run at the manufacturer's facility with no indication of any mechanical problem and the #2 fuel control unit was flow checked and examined. The RPM WARN CB was observed to be tripped at the accident site and tests demonstrated that with this CB out, the engine failure and low rotor RPM lights and horns were inoperative. The engine DEICE locking toggle switches (engine anti-ice system switches) were observed in the off position at the accident site. The Flight Manual contained no Height-Velocity Diagram for a two-engine inoperative condition.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.